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IN 'THE SUPREME~ COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND B. MAXFIELD,
P laintvff and Respondent,
-vs.-

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
vVESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY
a corporation,

Case No. 8854

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. ,All italics are ours.

FACTS
This lawsuit .arose from an injury which Plaintiff
received on July 25, 1955, approximately 8 n1iles west
of Green River, Utah, on U.S. Highway No. 50 and 6.
The lawsuit was filed under the provisions of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 51, et seq.
The injuries to plaintiff resulted when a railroad
truck in which he was a pa.ssenger in the hack tipped
over throwing him out (R. 23). He testified that most
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of the impact received from being thrown out of the back
of the truck was to his left shoulder and that he felt a
great amount of pain in the left shoulder from the time
of the injury. Plaintiff was taken to the hospital,at Price,
Utah, where he remained for approximately eight days.
He was treated by Dr. Hubbard who found that his
shoulder had been dislocated. The doctor immediately
took x-r.ays and re-set the shoulder after giving plaintiff
an anaesthetic (R. 24, 108, 119). Plaintiff had never had
any trouble with his left shoulder prior to July 25, 1955
(R. 23, 34). I-Iis left arm was bound tight to his side
until a day or two before he left the hospital at which
time a splint was placed on his .arm. Plaintiff was released from the hospital \Yith instructions not to raise
his arm too n1uch (R. 24-25). Subsequently Maxfield was
seen by Dr. Hubbard in the doctor's office on August 12,
16 and 23 and September 6 and 27. The doctor released
him for \Vork on October 1, 1955 (R. 110). Plaintiff has
suffered p.ain in his left shoulder e\er since the accident
(R. ~7, 33).
Jfaxfie ld first becan1e acquainted \Yith Stephen, the
elain1 agent of defendant \vhile l1e \Yas recuperating at
honH\ "~hen Stephen ea1ne to his house to see him
(H.. ~G). --:\t a later date Stephen took plaintiff to the
scPne oF the areident .and obtained inforn1ation from hnn
:u~ to ho". thP aeeident happened. On one of these visits
NtPphPn told plaintiff that if he needed Inoney he could
:ulv;lJH•<\ hi111 sonlP (R.. ~()).On Septe1nber 10, 1955, Step]JPil

gav<\ pln inti ff a clH:'\ek in the an1ount of $200.00 and

ltn<l hint ~ign an ngreen1ent (Ex. P-1). This .agreeinen1
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provided, among other things, that plaintiff agreed that
said advancement would not be considered as an admission of liability on the part of the Railroad Company
and that he agreed with the Railroad Company that he
would endeavor, in good faith, to adjust and settle any
claim for his injuries without resorting to ligitation.
On October 1st when plaintiff had been released by
the doctor to go back to work he went to Stephen's office
at the Grand Junction Railroad Yards and had a conversation with him in regard to the settlement of his
case. Stephen offered plaintiff a settlement of $710.00
which was payment of lost w:ages for his time off work.
Maxfield complained .of this offer stating that he did not
think it was a just settlement inasmuch as he was paid
nothing for his pain and suffering which he was still
having .at that time. He then stated that he informed
Stephen that he, plaintiff, was thinking of getting a
lawyer and that maybe he could get more that way. In
response to this Stephen stated ''You will lose your job
and it will take months for a procedure of that kind
.anyway". After this, plaintiff accepted the settlement
because "I will take what I can get then because I don't
want to lose my job" (R. 30). At that time Stephen
typed up the release and had Maxfield sign it, giving
him in return a check in the sum of $510.00 (Ex. P-2).
DT. Hubbard testified that in a case such as this
he would not anticipate a permanent injury and that he
did not anticip.ate any permanent injury in this particular case (R. 111). l-Ie stated (R. 110):
''A.

No. I thought it was just a normal treatment
for a dislocated left shoulder, and the man
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went back to work with no complications.
There were no complications at all".
The plaintiff testified (R. 32):
'' Q.

Now tell me, did you have any idea at tliat
time that you had a permanent injury in your
shoulder~

A.

No, Sir."

Speaking of the time when the release was signed,
October 1, 1955, Stephen testified (R. 91):
"Q.

At the time you made this settlement it was
your idea that he had no permanent disability, wasn't it~

A. As far as I know that is right."
Dr. Reed Smoot Clegg, a local orthopedic surgeon,
testified that he examined plaintiff in his office on July
5, 1957, and January 24, 1958, and that x-rays of plaintiff's left shoulder were taken on both occasions (R. 65).
Dr. Clegg testified that the x-ra·ys showed a callus or
bone deposit in the region of the shoulder bone on the
upper end of the hu1nerus, or arn1 bone. This formation
had the appearance on the x-rays of a lmob (Ex. P-3,
P-4). Dr. Clegg further testified that tlris callus deposit
usually occurs after so1ne kind of .an injury and that it
usually 1nanifests itself 'Yith the con1plaint of pain and
tPnderness in that area and that occasionally there is
~onte secondary "Tt>.akness because the injured person
seen1~ to favor it. In his opinion plaintiff had incurred
a lOj~ per111anent partial disability in his left shoulder
based on the fact that there is still slight 'Yeakness,
tenderness and a deposit of bone .about the shoulder
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joint (R. 66-'67). Dr. Clegg further testified that assuming prior to July 25, 1955, plaintiff had never had any
complaints or limitations in his left shoulder and that
on said date he was thrown out of .an overturned truck
and landed on his left shoulder and suffered a dislocation and that the dislocation was reduced at the hospital
and that ever since that time and at the present time
plaintiff has pain in his shoulder and with the examinations that he had performed and the x-rays that he
had taken, in his ·Opinion that type of injury pro b.ably
caused the disability which plaintiff has (R. 67). Dr.
Clegg further testified that the callus formation would
restrict motion in the extreme ranges (R. 71).
Dr. Hubbard, an employee of respondent's hospital
association, came from Price, Utah, where he practices,
to testify. On the witness stand he exhibited an antagonistic, argumentative and biased attitude in favor of the
Railroad which is exhibited to some degree in the following testimony ( R. 119) :

"Q. You gave him an
A.

You have to do that.

Q. Why did you do
A.

anaesthetic~

that~

So I wouldn't hurt the man, but I have reduced a hundred shoulders without anything.

Q. I understand, but in this case you didn't, did
you~

A.

I think I could have done it with Raymond

Q. I understand, but you did give it, didn't
A.

you~

Of course, that is an exceptional-
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Q.

Did you or didn't you~

A.

I gave him an anaesthetic, a mild, a very mild
Anaesthesia, not an anaesthetic, a mild anaesthesia.

Q. What did you give him~
A.

Well, you might call it semi-comatose. See,
they are partially conscious.

Q. And he would feel it~
A.

I guess he would feel it a little.

Q. Why did you give it to him~

A. To relax him."
(R. 121-122)

'' Q. In other words, Mr. Maxfield, at the time
you took that bandage off, had absolutely no
pain at all'
A.

That is right.

Q.

And he could move that whole arm any way
around?

A.

I ·will tell you

"~hy.

:nrR....A. SHTON:
tell you

''11:~

don't you let him

"~hy?

.A..

..A. dislocation isn't a fr.acture. ...A.. dislocation,
you put bark "'"hat God placed there. It i~ not
broken ; it is nothing. A ballplayer has a
fingt\r pulled out, a dislocated finger. Doesn't
he go and play~ Sure he does.

Q.

Just a 1ninute.

A.

I ha.ve studied .anatomy and surgery and you
haven't.
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THE COURT: Wait a minute, Doctor.
Let's don't argue.
THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Judge
Hanson.
THE ,C:OURT: Just answer his questions.
THE WITNESS: All right. Yes.

Q.

(By Mr. Roberts) Just be seated. Just be
seated, Doctor."

Also, Dr. Hubbard testified that all persons over
40 years of age vvould hurt in their shoulder on moving
their arms to the extreme position. DT. Hubbard stated
at (R. 123):

'' Q.

Doctor, at the age of fifty I am supposed to
hurt when I go like this, if that is right (illustrating).

A.

If you .are playing basketball I think it would
bind up quite quickly.

Q.

I am not saying that. When I move in the
extremes I am supposed to hurt~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Everybody over forty years

A.

Yes."

old~

At the close of the evidence plaintiff's counsel made
a motion to .amend as follows (R.. 128):
''MR. ROBERTS: We move at this time to
amend to conform to the proof in connection with
the evidence that was introduced in the case about
a mutual mistake of fact, which was present if
the claim agent and the plaintiff testified that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at the time they made the settlement that they
were under the impression there was no pennanent injury.''
This motion was granted by the court and mutual
mistake of fact was given to the jury as well as fraud
and undue influence.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE "PREPONDERANCE'' RULE IS THE ESTABLISHED
FEDERAL RULE FOR PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN IN AVOIDING A RELEASE.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED PLAINTIFF TO AMEND HIS ·COMPLAINT AND PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT.
POINT III.
THE GROSS UNFAIRNESS OF A SETTLEMENT IS A
PROPER MATTER FOR THE JURY TO CONSIDER IN CONNE·CTION WITH PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE AS TO UNDUE
INFLUEN·CE EXERCISED UPON Hll\1 BY DEFENDANT'S
CLAIM AGENT.
.A.RGU)IE~T

POINT I.
THE "PREPONDERANCE'' RULE IS THE ESTABLISHED
FEDERAL RULE FOR PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN IN AVOIDING A RELEASE.

It is adJnitt<?d that the Federal La\v is controlling
a~ to this quc'~tion. Defendant relies entirely upon the
ea~<' of I\ irthgcstue r r. De-n re r & RZ:.o Grand c TTrester1t
ll. Il. (~a. dPcided ]\fay 17 1950, 118 U. 20, 218 P. 2d 685,
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for establishing the Federal la\v on this question. A
review of the recent developments in the Federal L,aw
on this subject will show that the Kirchgestner case is
no longer controlling. In its decision on rehearing at
118 U. 41, 233 P. 2d 699 June 19, 1951, the Supreme
Court ·of Utah referred to Federal Law cited in its
decision granting a rehearing at 118 U. 37, 225 P. 2d 754.
It there appears that the Utah Supreme Court relied
on the c.ase of Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 3rd
Cir. 162 F. 2d 832, and on appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States at 332 U.S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296, 92 L.
Ed. 242. In the Callen case the trial judge instructed the
jury that the release was not binding as to permanent
injuries suffered by the plaintiff. The Third Circuit
Court, on appeal, reversed the trial court for the reason
that the release issued was not presented to the jury and
stated that the proper rule was the clear, unequivocal
and convincing rule. The Circuit c·ourt opinion was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. The
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit Court on the ground that the
plaintiff had the burden of proving fraud or mutual
mistake and that the question should have been given
to the jury to decide. However, in its opinion the
Supreme Court made no statement whatsoever as to
whether the burden was by a preponderance or by clear,
unequivocal and convincing evidence.
It is interesting to note that there was a four judge
dissent consisting of Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy
and Rutledge in which it was stated that Federal EmSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ployers Liability Act cases should be governed by the
same rule which applies to releases by seamen in Admirality Cases, which is that the defendant would have the
burden of proving that the release was not obtained by
fraud. Thus, two of the judges who are now on tlie
Supreme Court, Black and Douglas, would have an even
more liberal rule for plaintiffs in F .E.L.A. cases than
the preponderance of the evidence rule. \"\Te desire to
make special note of this fact at this time so that it may
be borne in mind during the following discussion of later
developments in the Supreme Court of the United States.
Over seven months after the decision on rehearing
in the Kirchgestner case, on February 4, 1952, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on the case
of Dice u. Akron, Canton & Y oungstozrn R. R. Co. 342
U.S. 359, 72 S. Ct. 312. In the Dice case the trial judge
applied the procedure of the State of Ohio to an F.E.L.A.
ra~e in trying the issue .as to the validity of the release
~0parately as a court of equity. The trial court held that
there 'Yas no clear, unequiYocal and convincing evidence
of fraud. The 1najority opinion in the Dice case was
'Yritt0n bY
. Justice Blaek and announced bY. Justice
Douglas holding that the trial court in trying the relPaf;P issue as a eourt of equity~ had denied a jury trial
to pln in tiff to 'rhieh ht"\ " . as entitled under the Federal
~~~tnployerfi Liability _.:\ct. Justice Frankfurter along 'Yith
,J ustie<'fi H,Ped~ tT.nekson and Burton concurred in the
rPv<')r~al of tht' Diet' ease for a different reason. In a
~Pparah)

<)pinion Jnstiee Frankfurter concurred in re-

ver~al ror the reason that the trial court had applied
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the rule .of clear, unequivoc.al and convincing evidence
and stated at page 318 :
"Such proof of fraud need be only by a preponderance of the relevant evidence. See Union
Pacific Railroad Co. vs. Harris, 158 U.S. 326, 15
S. Ct. 843, 39 L. Ed. 1003. ''
Thus, it can be seen from the special opinion of
Justice Fr.ankfurter in the Dice case that Justices Frankfurter, Reed, Jackson and Burton agreed that the preponderance rule applied in F.E.L.A. cases. It may be
noted that undoubtedly at least Justices Black and
Douglas who were on the majority side in the Dice case
would .agree with the rule as stated by Justice Frankfurter as opposed to the clear, unequivocal and convincing rule inasmuch as in the Callen case both of these
Justices had spoken out for a rule even more liberal for
the plaintiff than the preponderance of the evidence rule,
that is, they would place upon the Railroad the burden
of proving the release was not tainted by fraud.
It may be noted at this time that the case of Un~on
Pacif~c R. Co. v. Flarris, cited by Justice Frankfurter,
indicates that the Federal rule is the preponder.ance of
the evidence rule. This was a case brought in a Federal
Court for personal injuries received by plaintiff while
he was a passenger on defendant's train. There was .a
release issue involved in the case. The trial court instructed the jury that plaintiff was not bound by the
release if his mind "\vas in such condition from drugs and
whiskey that he could not underst.and what he was doing
or if he understood the settlement was for only medical
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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expenses and loss of time and he did not read the release
because p·rostrated by the accide·nt. In the trial court's
instructions, reviewed by the Supreme Court, the tria]
court, in effect, told the jury ''if you believe certain
facts then the plaintiff is not bound by the release". At
no time did the trial court state that the plaintiff had to
show these facts by clear and convincing evidence. In
speaking in the normal manner concerning these things
it is inescapable that the trial court was applying the
preponderance of the evidence rule. If it had applied
the clear and convincing rule it would have so stated.
By approving the instructions given as the:~ ,. . .ere, it can
be reasoned that the Supreme Court approved of the
preponderance of the evidence rule. Certainly this is
what Justice Frankfurter thought when he cited this
case as authority in the Dice decision.
Subsequent to the Dice case, on August 4, 1952, the
Third Circuit Court of .A_ppeals decided the case of
Purvrs v. Pennsylvanz;a Ry. Co. 198 F. 2d, 631. It can be
noted that this is the san1e Circuit Court which had
earlier decided the Callen case holding that the Federal
rule was the clear, unequiYocal and eonvincing rule. In
Purvis the trial court had held that even though the
broad issue \\~as correctly an issue to be decided by the
jury, the endorse1nent on the back of the cheek received

hy- the plaintiff beneath release language printed on the
ha<~.k

of the cheek eonstituted a ratification of the release

·and accordingly set aside .a verdict and judgn1ent in
favor of the- plaintiff. The Cireuit Court held that this
\Va~ not eorrect and that the endorsen1ent of the check
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was not a separate transaction. The Court then went
on to set at rest ,any doubt that there may have been
concerning the question of what plaintiff's burden of
proof is in order to set aside a release. The court, on
page 633, discussed the history of this law and adopted
the preponderance of the evidence rule. The court stated:
"Until Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. R. Co. :x· :x· *
it had been assumed that the Federal rule w,as
that the evidence had to be clear, unequivocal
and convincing. * * * That test was followed by
us in Callen v. Pennsylvania R. C'o. 162 F. 2d 832.
Callen was affirmed by the Supreme Court * * *,
but the above precise question was not formally
passed upon by the court. * * *Mr. Justice Frankfurter who had been of the majority in Callen
wrote the dissenting opinion in Dice. * * * Mr.
Justice Jackson, who wrote the Callen decision,
Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Burton joined
with him. The dissent agreed with the majority
on reversal but thought that the case should be
returned for further proceedings'* * * on the sole
question of fraud in the release.' * * * and Mr.
Justice Frankfurter went on to say that, 'such
proof of fraud need be ,only by a preponderance
of relevant evidence.'
"We are satisfied that if and when the problem is squarely before the Supreme Court the
rule pronounced will be in .accord with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's above quoted language and therefore, in fairness to the district judges of this
Circuit and t:o ourselves, we adopt that test for
this ,Circuit in applicable instances.''
It can be seen that in the Purvis case the indication
of the Supreme Court of the United States as to its
feelings on this question was so strong that the Third
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Circuit Court reversed itself on its holding in the Callen
case. It may also be noted that the Callen case was the
case on which the Supreme Court :of Utah relied in
arriving at its holding in the Kirchgestner case. Certiorari w.as denied in the Purvis case at 344 U.S. 898, 97
L. Ed. 694, 73 S. Ct. 278. The Supreme c·ourt of the
United States has cited the Purvis case with approval
in the case of South Buffalo Ry. Co. v. Gertrude Sloan
Ahern, 34,! U.S. 367, 97 L. Ed. 395, 73 S. Ct. 340 (1952).
This case involved a question of the validity of a la\v
in New York providing that a claimant under F.E.L.A.
could waive his rights and proceed under Workmen's
Compensation Law in New York. The court held that the
law, being permissive rather than coersive, did not unconstitutionally conflict with the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In discussing generally the nature of a railroader's rights under F.E.L.A. Justice Clark stated at
401:
''To be sure, peculiarities of local law may
not gnaw at rights rooted in federal legislation.
(Citing cases) * * * Untainted by fraud or overreaching, full and fair compromises of F.E.L.A.
claims do not clash 'vith the policy· of the Act.
Callen v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 332 U.S. 625, 92 L.
Ed. 242, 68 S. Ct. 296 (1948). The validity of such
an agreement, however, raises a federal question
to be resolved by federalla,Y-. (Citing cases) * * *
and, 111 indful of the benevolent ailns of the Act,
we have jealously scrutinized private arrangelllPnts for the bartering H.\\~ay of federal rights.
(Citing cases 'l~nclud£ng the Purvi:s case).
AftP r th P Purvis case, in 1952, the Circuit Court of
Appeals f.or the First Circuit decided the case of CamSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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erUn v. New York ~Cent. R. Co. 199 F. 2d 698. This case
involved validity of a release in an F.E.L.A. case. The
plaintiff had testified in a deposition, among other
things, that the claim agent represented that plaintiff
was entitled only to Workmen's Compensation benefits
at the rate of $25.00 per week for his time off. The trial
judge granted a summary judgment based on the testimony of plaintiff in his depostion. On appeal the cases
cited by defendant in support of the summary judgment
rendered by the trial court were all cases which had
held that the rule was that plaintiff had the burden of
setting asiqe the release by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence. The court stated at p age 704:
1

''This may have been the rule at one time
but, at least as applied to cases under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, we take the federal rule
now to be, as was indicated in the recent case
·of Purvis v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. 3 Cir. 1952,
198 F. 2d '631, that it is enough if the employee
establishes, by a preponderance of the relevant
evidence, the facts invalidating the release. ''
The Purvis case has also been followed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of Allison v.
Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. (1954) 62 NW 2d 37 4.
This was an action to recover for personal injuries in
which the defendant s.et up a release as a defense. The
trial court instructed that plaintiff's burden in upsetting
the release was by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
The jury awarded a verdict for plaintiff and the trial
court entered judgment for defendant notwithstanding
the verdict. One of the questions on appeal was whether
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the burden was by a preponderance of the evidence or
by cle~ar, certain and unequivocal evidence. The court
stated at page 379:
"It seems clear under the latest federal decisions that the applicable rule governing the
weight of evidence essential to the avoidance of
.a release for mistake or fraud, under the Federul
Employers' Liability Act, is the 'fair preponderance' rather than the 'clear unequivocal and convincing' evidence rule.' '
The court proceeds to review the Dice case and the
Purvis and Ca1nerlin cases and states at page 380:
''In accordance ·with the rule expressed in
these late decisions, we must apply the 'fair preponderance' rule in weighing the evidence here
presented.''
It n1ay be pointed out that a rene,,- of Shepards
R-eporter Citations subsequent to the Purris ease sho-ws
that there has been no instance "-hatsoever where a
suh~equent ease has n1odified in the least the decision
In the PurYis ease.
It is r<'~pectfull~- sub1nitted that the federal la"- is
"-hat t hP Supre1ne ('~ourt of the lTnited State8 says it is.
11 i~ obYion~ fron1 foregoing that the Supre1ne Court of
thP lTnitPd ~tatPs has clear!~- spoken its preference for
1he 1) I~eponderanc<' rult'. The faet that Justices Douglas
and BJ:tek "·ere on tlH' nutjorit~- opinion of the Diee case
nnd 1hl\rpfor<' "·t'rt:) not required to state their Yie\YS
n~ to thi~ i~~lH' .and in Yie,,- of their stand on the Callen
e.:t~P \VhPr<\ in t]H' dissPnt they held that the rule should
hP PYt'll 1nore lih<'ral than the preponderance rule 1nakes
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it certain that at least two judges In addition to the
four on the Dice dissent would hold for the preponderance rule as opposed to the clear, unequivocal and convincing rule. Furthermore, the fact that the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in the Purvis case and cited the
Purvis case with approval in the Ahern case is a further
indication of its feeling as to this question of law. The
Third Circuit Court in the Purvis case reversed its own
decision in the c~allen case on the strength of the Dice
case and was subsequently followed by the First Circuit
Court in the Camerlin case and by the Supreme Court
of Minnesota in the Allison case. It appears that there
is now no question whatsoever but that the federal rule
is that a plaintiff need only prove by a preponderance
of the evidence facts sufficient to avoid a release for
fr.aud or mutual mistake of fact.
In a recent decision our Utah State Supre1ne Court
has clearly indicated an intention to dep.art from prior
niceties of distinction with regard to burden of proof
between the preponderance of the evidence ru1e, and
the clear and convincing evidence rule.
In re Swan's Estate, decided February 15, 1956,
4 Ut. 2d, 277, 293 P. 2d 682, involved the burden of proof
problem with respect to overcoming the presumption
of fraud and undue influence upon a showing of confidential relationship, procurement of a will and heirship
in the will. In that case the contestant of the will clairned
that the proponents of the will had the burden of establishing a lack of fraud and undue influence by clear
and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court of Utah
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reversing its prior position in the case of J ardivne v.
Archibald, 3 Ut. 2d 88, 279 P. 2d 454, adopted the preponderance of the evidence rule and rejected the clear
and convincing evidence rule. We quote from said deCISion:

"After careful study and consideration we
conclude that this presumption shifts the burden
on to the confidential advisor of pursuading or
convincing the fact finder by a preponderance of
the evidence that no fraud or undue influence
was exerted, or in other words, he has the burden
of convincing the fact finder from the evidence
that it is more probable that he acted perfectly
fair with his confidents; that he made complete
disclosure of all material information available
and took no unfair advantage of his superior
position than that he exerted fraud or undue influence to obtain the benefits in question. ThiJs
is contrary to our holding in the Jardine case,
1rhich is supported by the California cases and
so1ne other decl:Sions that clear and conv~nct"'ng
eicz1dence to the contra·ry is necessary to overco1ne
such p1·e szun pt~·o n. Tf'e reach this conclusi,on because we feel that the rule is 'lnO're clear and
understandable than the rule requirz~ng clear and
coJn;incz~ng el~-z!dence; that this rule is nzore apt to
produce a just result and zs Jnore ge·nerally recog1n\~ed as the correct rule govern·ing th£s sttua.ti'o·n."
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED PLAINTIFF TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT AND PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURlr ON MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT.

RulP 1fl (h) lTt-ah Rules of Civil Procedure gives the
trinl court- a \Yide diseretion in alhnYing an1endn1ents to
eon f'ortn to the Pvidence. The trial court in the ease at
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bar allowed plaintiff to amend so as to put in issue
the question of mutual Inistake of fact. The evidence
which was brought out at the trial clearly permitted
the question ·of mutual mistake of f.act to be presented
to the jury. The evidence which brought out this issue
came in without objection by counsel for defendant. The
evidence of which defendant complains merely had to
do with whether or not the claim agent knew that pain
and suffering is one ·of the elements of damages to which
plaintiff is entitled under the F.E.L.A. This evidence
pertains to the transaction between plaintiff and the
claim agent, was proper cross-examination and was material to show that the claim agent did not fully advise
plaintiff as to is rights. It tends to corroborate plaintiff's testimony that the claim agent threatened him with
the loss of his job if he would not accept the settlement.
The following facts were thought to be important as
to mutual mistake of fact by this Court in the Kirchgestner case, Supra, as stated at page 690:
''The plaintiff had been examined by two
doctors who had been unable to find anything
wrong with him and one of whom had told him
that he would be 'all right'. The plaintiff expessed
to Sayger (claim agent) that he thought he was
able to return to work. Dr. Fuller had assured
Sayger that the plaintiff was able to return to
work. Sayger testified that he did not know at
that time that the plaintiff was suffering from a
dis~abling hack injury and admitted that in
making the settlement he (Sayger) acted upon
that mistaken belief. The f.act that the amount
of the settlement closely approximates what the
plaintiff had lost in earnings is an indication that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

both parties acted upon the belief that the plaintiff's sufferings were at an end or would be
short-lived.''
And further at page 691 :
"To tell a layman who has been injured that
he will be about again in a short time is to do
more than prophesy about his recovery. No doubt
it is a forecast, but it is ordinarily more than a
forecast; it is an assurance as to his present
condition, and so understood.''
(Above quoted by court in Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Zimmer 197 P. 2d 363)
In the case .at bar plaintiff had been released to
return to \York by Dr. Hubbard. Plaintiff testified that
at the time of the settle1nent he thought he would make
a co1nplete recovery. He testified that his objection to
1nerely accepting lost ,,~ages as a con1plete settlement
\Yas that he ,,-as reeeiYing nothing for the p.ain and
suffering he had had fro1n the date of the injury up to
the ti1ne of the settlen1ent. The elailn agent Stephen
testified that he kne'Y plaintiff had been released by the
doctor and had returned to "~ork. He stated tltat as far
a~ he kne'v plaintiff had no per1nanent disabilit:~. The
fact that both plaintiff and the clain1 agent thought
thnt plaintiff had only n ternporary disability \Yas clearly
e~tahli~hPd hY
. thi~ PYidence and "-as fortified by. the fact
that tllP doet or had rt"lea~{?d plaintiff for duty. In addition, tlH-. fnet that th·e a1nount of the settle1nent 'vas
idPn t i eal to tlH~ lo~t 'r.ngP~ of pin in tiff is another indication thnt both parti~·~ aeted upon the belief that plain·tirf·'H HnfferingH "rere nt an end or "Tould be short lived.
It i~ re~pectfull~T subinittPd that this eYidence is ahuost
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identical to the evidence which was approved by this
court in the Kirchgestner case.
As to the evidence that plaintiff had a permanent
disability of 10% in his left shoulder one need only recall
the testimony ·of Dr. R.eed Clegg who is a specialist in
the field of orthopedics. The jury obviously believed the
testimony of Dr. Clegg. Dr. Clegg testified that his
examination showed that plaintiff had a permanent
partial disability in the left shoulder of 10%. He further
testified that the disability was caused by ''the fact that
there is still slight weakness, there is .a tenderness, and
that there is a deposit of bone about the shoulder joint.''
The deposit of bone about the shoulder joint appeared
as a knob on the x-rays of Dr. Clegg. This knob appeared
to he substantial and stood out in these x-r.ays. Dr.
Clegg further testified that such a deposit was usually
caused by trauma. Also in ansvver to a hypothetical
question in which it was assumed that plaintiff had had
no complaints or difficulty with the shoulder prior to
the aecident and had had eomplaints since the time of
the accident and with his condition as found by Dr.
Clegg's examination, Dr. Clegg gave it as his opinion
that the accident caused the disability from vvhich plaintiff is suffering. Plaintiff established the facts of the
hypothetical question in his testimony.
In regard to the witness presented by defendant,
Dr. Hubbard, there is no evidence in the record from
which defendant can n1ake a statement as it does in its
brief that Dr. I-Iubbard was a disinterested witness.
This court in the case of Mooney v. Denver & Rio Grande
Western R. Co. (1950) 118 U. 307, 221 P. 2d 628, recogSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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nized the fact that this defendant has control over doctors in the hospital ass-ociation. This case presented a
question of forum non conveniens. In discussing the inconvenience asserted by defendant this eourt stated at
page 341:
"Little weight need he given in this case to
the state lines and lack of process as the witnesses are all either employees of defendant or
doctors closely associated with the company and
all are available if paid ·at the same rate they
would he paid for attendance in Denver.''
And again at page 354:
"In non-fatal accidents where there is a
question of the extent of the injury suffered the
plaintiff is often dependent entirely on the evidence of doctors employed by the railroad. The
railroad not only employs the doctors who treat
the injured, but have in their employ every type
of expert in obtaining evidence * * *"
In this case Dr. Hubbard ca1ne all the \Yay from
Price, Utah, to testify on behalf of the railroad comp.any,
and his demeanor on the \Yitness stand indicated very
clearly that he was a biased \Yitness and \Yas very definitely interested in doing everything he could for the
railroad company. The jury had the benefit of seeing
the doctor on the \vitness stand and observing his de~
meanor. Dr. Hubbard's testin1ony \vas dian1etrically opposed to the testin1ony of Dr. Clegg. He testified that
the bone deposit or callus as sho\\~1 on Dr. Clegg's
x-ravs
disabilitY
., would not cause anY
"
. and t.h.at everv.
person over the age of forty \vould haYe pain in his
shoulders at extre1ne ranges of ntotion. Furthermore, he
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refused to assume that plaintiff had any pain .at all in
his shoulder after the dislocation had been reduced and
even hesitated to state the plaintiff had any pain in the
shoulder at the time the reduction was made even
though he admitted that he administered an anaesthetic
to plaintiff at the time of making said reduction. Dr.
Hubbard testified that the x-r.ays which he took on the
day of the accident showed the same bone callus which
Dr. Clegg's x-rays showed so clearly, although even to
the unpracticed eye there is no such appearance on these
x-rays. (See exhibits P-3, P-4, D-5 and D-6). In addition
to this Dr. Hubbard testified that the callus would not
cause any disability whatsoever which was in direct
conflict with the evidence of Dr. Clegg. Obviously, the
jury believed Dr. Clegg over Dr. Hubbard and discredited the evidence of Dr. Hubbard as it was entitled to
do.
The evidence cle.arly showed that there was a mistake in the mind of DT. Hubbard, Stephen and plaintiff
as to the fact that plaintiff had a permanent disability in
his left shoulder. Plaintiff testified that he had never
in his life had any symptoms or tr·ouble in his left shoulder prior to the accident and that he had trouble in
said shoulder from the date of the accident to the present
time. Plaintiff had been assured by the doctor that there
was nothing wrong with the shoulder and had no idea
whatsoever that the shoulder would not get completely
well. The evidence which the jury chose to believe as to
the permanent disability in plaintiff's shoulder, was the
evidence of Dr. Clegg. Dr. Clegg gave it as his opinion
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that plaintiff had a 10% permanent partial disability
in his left shoulder.
The evidence which c.ame in without objection from
defendant clearly showed a mutual mistake of fact, and
the trial court properly allowed plaintiff to amend his
complaint to conform to the evidence and properly submitted this issue to the jury.
POINT III.
THE GROSS UNFAIRNESS OF A SETTLEMENT IS A
PROPER MATTER FOR THE JURY TO CONSIDER IN CONNECTION WITH PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE AS TO UNDUE
INFLUEN·CE EXERCISED UPON HIM BY DEFENDANT'S
CLAIM AGENT.

It has been generally recognized as a principle of
law that an unconscionable or unfair contract gives rise to
an inference of fraud. Specifically, a recent F.E.L.~\.
case involving a question as to validit~~ of .a release is
squarely in point on the subject presented in defendant's
Point III. This is the case of Seaboard Ai'r Li-ne Railroad
Company v. G~ll, Fourth Circuit (1955), 227 F. 2d 64,
which was an action involving a release "\Yhere plaintiff
claimed that fraud and undue influence "\Yere used in
obtaining the release. The trial court instructed the jury
that gross inadequacy of consideration alone is sufficient
evidence to sustain an allegation of fraud and undue
influence provided that the eonsideration is so inadequate as to shock the conscience ·or the. n1oral sense of
right and wrong. Also the court instructed that inadequacy of consideration, although not gross~ is a proper
circurn~tanee to be considered upon the issue of fraud in
connection 'vith other evidence .and circun1stances sufSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ficient to show fraud. The Circuit Court in reviewing
this instruction stated that it was not erroneous on the
ground that it averted the jury's attention from other
evidence in the case if the jury found that the amounts
paid were grossly inadequate.
The argument m.ade by counsel for plaintiff of which
the defendant complains was to the effect that the gross
inadequacy of the consideration paid plaintiff for his
injury gave credance to and supported the o·ther evidence
of plaintiff that the claim agent had threatened him
with the loss of his job if he would not accept the
settle·ment. This argument was based on the Gill case
and was perfectly proper under that case. Of course,
under the Gill case it would be improper to instruct the
jury that they could not consider the fairness or unfairness ·of the consideration paid for the release. Certainly, if the consideration had been fair and just
defendant would be entitled to have the jury use this
in support of its testimony that no fraud or undue influence was practiced on plaintiff.
The evidence shows that plaintiff had received a
severe initial injury by being thrown from the bed of
the truck. In addition to the dislocation of the left
shoulder, he was hit in the mouth and chin, cut his eye
and several teeth were loosened. He could hardly eat
when he was afterwards in the hospital because of this
(R. 24). Subsequent to the accident, plaintiff suffered
severe pain while in the hospital, and from the time the
shoulder was reduced and his arm strapped to his side
and later put in splints plaintiff suffered continuou::;
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pain in his left shoulder. The pain did not leave plaintiff
after he returned home and hadn't left him to the date
of the trial. Although plaintiff felt that he would make
a complete recovery, he felt that the offer of settlement
for lost wages alone was grossly unfair because it took
no account whatsoever ·of the experience he had gone
through and the great pain and suffering he had endured.
His resistence to the offer made by the claim agent
was beaten down by the threat that plaintiff would lose
his j·ob if he did not accept this offer. Certainly, it is
common sense that the jury could consider the gross
inadequacy of the consideration paid for the release as
corroboration of the evidence that the claim agent had
p·racticed fraud and undue influence upon plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the trial court acted properly in
instructing the jury that plaintiff's burden ·of proving
fraud and mutual mistake of fact "\Yas by a preponderance of the evidence inas1nuch as this ru1e has been
adopted by the Federal Courts subsequent to the Kirchgestner case. In addition, the evidence produced .at the
trial clearly justified the allo"\Yance of plaintiff's ainendment to conform to the proof as to n1utual n1istake of
fact. ·The evidence heretofore outlined "\Yas clearly the
same type of evidence that "\Yas relied on by this Court
in the l{irehgestner case in supporting a finding of
n1utnal n1istake of fact. Furthern1orE\ the jury could
very properly consider the gross inadequacy of the settlPtnent aH corroborating the other eYidence surrounding
the proenre1nent of the relea~e in deter1nining that the
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claim agent had exercised fr.aud and undue influence
upon plaintiff in obtaining the settlement. For the
reasons as set forth herein we respectfully submit that
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted

RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
JOHN L. BLACK
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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